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1959] RECENT DECISIONS 621 
TRUSTS-REsULTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS-RIGHT OF THIRD-PARTY 
DoNEE To ENFORCE ORAL TRUST OF LAND-Plaintiff alleged that her 
husband, having paid the purchase price on l~d intended as a: gift 
for her, caused title to be taken in the name of defendant to hold as trustee. 
There was, however, no written evidence to support these contentions. 
Plaintiff further alleged that she took possession and made valuable 
permanent improvements on the land with the approval of both her 
husband and defendant. One year after the husband's death and three 
years after plaintiff's entrance, defendant filed suit for possession. In the 
present action to enjoin that suit and to establish her ownership, the 
lower court held that plaintiff failed to state a claim. On appeal, held, 
reversed, one judge dissenting. If plaintiff's allegations are accepted as 
true, her complaint sets out facts upon which relief could be granted. 
Either a resulting trust or a constructive trust might be imposed in 
plaintiff's behalf.1 Binz v. Helvetia Florida Enterprises, (Fla. App. 1958) 
104 S. (2d) 124. 
Although the result of the principal case seems desirable, the theories 
of relief considered by the court are questionable. Generally, where one 
person furnishes the consideration for a conveyance of land to another, 
the grantee is presumed to hold for the payor under a purchase-money 
resulting trust.2 The court in the principal case, however, seems to have 
1 The court also referred to the enforceability of the oral gift under the doctrine 
of part performance. This theory, however, would be to no avail if the trust transaction 
left plaintiff's hus:band with no interest to give her. Therefore, it seems that this was 
not considered a separate ground for relief but was ·being used in conjunction with the 
finding of a trust. 
2 Statutes in some jurisdictions have abolished the rule. Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §381.170; 
Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§555.7-555.9; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §§501.07-501.09; 49 N.Y. 
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §94; Wis. Stat. (1957) §§231.07-231.09. 
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indicated that where the payor intends a gift of the land to a third party,3 
the grantee may hold on a resulting trust for the third party.4 In finding 
a resulting trust for a third party, a court necessarily acts upon the express 
intent of the parties. Yet such an ex.tension of the purchase-money resulting 
trust doctrine cannot be reconciled with the theory upon which it rests. 
The doctrine is justified by .the belief that one who furnishes the con-
sideration for land intends to benefit himself rather than "a stranger."5 
From this normal expectation the payor's intention is presumed without 
reference to the actual understanding of the parties. 6 Therefore, since 
the presumption should operate only in favor of the payor, indication of 
the existence of a resulting trust for plaintiff in the principal case would 
be unsound.7 But the equivocal language used by the court8 suggests an 
alternative analysis. The court may have been holding that a resulting 
trust did arise in favor of the payor-husband with plaintiff succeeding to 
his interest since his oral gift to her was enforceable under the doctrine 
of part performance.9 This analysis, however, seems defective also. While 
actual intent is not material in raising the presumption, it would seem 
that the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the payor's actual 
intention was not to benefit himself.10 In the principal case, proof by 
defendant-trustee of the existence of an oral trust for the plaintiff would 
seem to constitute such evidence. To allow the trustee to prevail over the 
payor on the existence of resulting trust by showing the existence of an 
unenforceable trust which he refuses to carry out may appear unfair.11 
8 The opinion states that plaintiff's allegations appeared sufficient for application 
of the resulting trust doctrine, but fails to make it clear in whose favor the rule would 
operate. 
4 For similar results, see Lewis v. Lewis, (Mo. 1920) 225 S.W. 974; In re Steel, 125 
N.Y.S. 187, 68 Misc. 579 (1910); Freeland v. Williamson, 220 Mo. 217, 119 S.W. 560 (1909); 
Siemon v. Schurck, 29 N.Y. 598 (1864). 
5 See, e.g., Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass. 598, 85 N.E. 945 (1908); Aborn v. Searles, 18 
R.I. 357, 27 A. 796 (1893); Marcilliat v. Marcilliat, 125 Ind. 472, 25 N.E. 597 (1890). 
6 For the historical and practical basis of the purchase-money resulting trust doctrine, 
see Scott, "Resulting Trusts Arising Upon the Purchase of Land," 40 HARv. L. REv. 669 
(1927). 
7 It might ·be argued that the husband was in substance making a gift of the money 
to plaintiff, thus making her the payor. Cf. Gaines v . .Drakeford, 51 S.C. 37, 27 S.E. 960 
(1897). But see 2 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §453, comment a (1935), repudiating this argument. 
s See note 3 supra. 
9Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882); Burgess v. Burgess, 306 III. 19, 137 N.E. 403 
(1922); Kinsell v. Thomas, 18 Cal. App. 683, 124 P. 220 (1912). The kind of "performance" 
ordinarily required to enforce a parol gift of land consists of taking possession and 
making valuable improvements with the donor's approval. See generally 2 CORBIN, CoN-
TRAcrs §441 (1950). 
10 Various types of evidence can be used to rebut the presumption. For examples 
see 2 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §§445-456 (1935). 
11 In In re Davis, (D.C. Mass. 1901) 112 F. 129, affd. sub nom. In re Peabody, (1st 
Cir. 1902) 118 F. 266, the court allowed the presumption to stand despite such proof. 
Since the defendant was unwilling to carry out the express trust, the court felt it would 
be "inequitable" to give weight to the evidence. 
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But in making the oral trust of land unenforceable, the Statute of Frauds 
does not make it unlawful or void.12 If the trustee chose to perform the 
oral trust, the payor could not object.13 
It was also indicated in the principal case that a constructive trust 
might be imposed on defendant "to prevent unjust enrichment and abuse 
of confidence."14 Without a showing of a confidential relationship between 
her husband and defendant, it is doubtful that plaintiff could recover on 
a constructive trust theory.15 Nevertheless, cases involving abuse of a 
confidential relationship16 have been recognized as an· exception to the 
general refusal of American courts to impose a constructive trust when 
a trustee breaches an oral trust of land.17 Though it would seem that 
the trustee is unjustly enriched at the expense of the one who paid value 
and reposed confidence, the cases usually construct the trust in favor of 
the third-party donee.18 The instant case, however, suggests no apparent 
ground for any finding of a confidential relationship. Thus it seems 
possible that the court may have been relying on the trust relationship 
itself as indicating that confidence was reposed in defendant. It is true 
that some courts have been very liberal in applying the doctrine of con-
fidential relationship.19 But expanding the concept to embrace every case 
involving a trust would result in the exception swallowing the rule.20 
Moreover, constructing a trust for the third party would be an undue 
violation of the Statute of Frauds since this would be giving effect to the 
actual intent of the parties. On the other hand, the court may have been 
suggesting that the constructive trust could operate in favor of the payor-
husband with plaintiff succeeding to his interest on the gift analysis. 
Such a result, even absent confidential relationship, would find support in' 
many writers who have criticized the American courts for not recognizing a 
12 Dove v. White, 211 Md. 228, 126 A. (2d) 835 (1956). 
13 Dickinson v. Dickinson, 131 Conn. 392, 40 A. (2d) 184 (1944); Hunt v. Hunt, 202 
Ark. 130, 149 S.W. (2d) 930 (1941); Faunce v. McCorkle, 321 Pa. 116, 183 A. 926 (1936). 
14 The terms "unjust enrichment" and "abuse of confidence" are apparently used 
in a synonymous sense by the court. The opinion, at 127, cites a definition which makes 
unjust enrichment "the result or• abuse of confidence. 
15 See 4 Scorr, TRUsrs, 2d ed., §453 (1956). 
16 E.g., Stahl v. Stahl, 214 Ill. 131, 73 N.E. 319; Metzger v. Metzger, 338 Pa. 564, 14 
A. (2d) 285. 
17 The "American rule" is illustrated by Patton v. Beecher, 62 Ala. 579 (1878). See 
cases cited in I Scorr, TRUsrs, 2d ed., §44, p. 310, n. 4 (1956). 
18 E.g., Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 P. (2d) 229 (1949); Stahl v. Stahl, note 
16 supra. 
19 E.g., Seeberger v. Seeberger, 325 Ill. 47, 155 N:E. 763 (1927). See Bogert, "Con-
fidential Relalions and Unenforceable ·Express Trusts," 13 CoRN. L. Q. 237 (1928). 
20 As Professor Bogert has observed, "It is difficult to imagine a grantor transferring 
realty to hold under oral promise in trust, unless the grantor is in considerable intimacy 
with the grantee and has a high degree of confidence in him." 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND 
TRUSTEES §496, p. 209 (1946). 
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distinction between giving restitution to the grantor and enforcing the 
parties' intent.21 
Despite the court's doubtful reasoning, there were present in the princi-
pal case elements upon which relief might be granted. Plaintiff's entrance 
into possession and adding valuable improvements could have warranted 
enforcement of the oral trust by the doctrine of part performance.22 The 
difference between using a constructive or resulting trust theory and 
enforcing an express trust in some cases may be significant. A constructive 
or resulting trust would charge the trustee only with a duty to convey the 
land to the beneficiary while enforcement of the express terms of an oral 
trust might involve obligating the trustee to perform other duties that 
may have been intended in connection with his holding legal title to 
the land. 
Lawrence E. Blades 
21 Sec, e.g., 2 CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs §401 (1950); Ames, "Constructive Trusts Based Upon 
the Breach of an Express Oral Trust of Land," 20 HARv. L. R.Ev. 549 (1907); Stone, 
, "Resulting Trusts and the Statute of Frauds," 6 COL. L. R.Ev. 326 (1906). 
22 Many courts have enforced oral trusts of realty under the doctrine of part per-
formance. See, e.g., Dove v. White, 211 Md. 228, 126 A. (2d) 835 (1956); Mulli v. Mulli, 
105 Cal. App. (2d) 68, 232 P. (2d) 556 (1951); Stewart v. Damron, 6!1 Ariz. 158, 160 P. 
(2d) !121 (1945); Thierry v. Thierry, 298 Mo. 25, 249 S.W. 946 (192!1). Entrance into pos-
session and valuable improvements by the beneficiary are usually required to make the 
oral trust enforceable under the doctrine of part performance. See 1 TRUSTS R.l!sTATEMENT 
§50 (1935). 
